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The RealiTy Of Real Time
Judith Wambacq and Bart Buseyne
Abstract According to Bernard Stiegler the technological contrivances that rule 
our world have set in motion dangerous developments. Although Stiegler is not a 
technophobe, he believes that the technological devices that are constructed around 
real time (live broadcasting, mobile phone communications, digital photography, etc.) 
introduce a new relation to time that jeopardises the cohesion of society. They erase 
the delay of time that is essential to it and thereby wipe away the singular, which is a 
crucial element in the construction of the social.
This essay examines the nature of this argument and queries its factual basis. It does 
this by first exploring the technological or prosthetic nature of Dasein by referring to 
Heidegger’s definition of Dasein as ec-static time. After this short exposition, the essay 
shows how Stiegler strengthens this pre-prosthetic nature of time that can be found in 
Heidegger into a time which is fully fledged prosthetic or fundamentally constituted 
by the technological devices that exteriorise it. The second part of the essay focuses on 
Stiegler’s hesitations and even contradictory statements regarding the contemporary 
production of time. Sometimes he presents real time as a factual accomplishment, 
sometimes he is more careful and characterises it to be merely a tendency; there are 
passages in which he proclaims the end of history, and other ones in which he presents 
that end as a fiction and a warning. The comments on the rather dramatic and 
evocative pages Stiegler inserts in La technique et le temps 1, together with ideas 
and comments of Maurice Blanchot and Richard Beardsworth, serve as a bridge to 
discuss the philosophical importance of an ambiguity in the actuality of real time.
Keywords real time, technology, origin by default, prosthesis, end of history, 
aporia, Heidegger’s Dasein, Derrida’s differance, Deleuze’s ideas
Our writing materials cooperate with our thoughts1
      Friedrich Nietzsche
Anybody who has recently attended a big music concert and is old enough to 
go back in time twenty years or so, will admit that today’s concert experience 
has radically changed. Big screens allow the viewers to see what happens on 
stage in every detail and from every angle. Certainly this is of great value 
for the people standing in the back and not being able to see the stage. But 
the screen does not only serve these people; it also absorbs the attention of 
the people in front of the stage. The eye of the camera is so powerful that 
people almost unconsciously abandon the preference to see with their own 
eyes. Does this technological innovation in which the delay between the event, 
the recording of it and the reception of the recording is almost reduced to 
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1. Translated by 
Judith Wambacq 
and Bart Buseyne. 
Original text: ‘Unser 
Schreibzeug arbeitet 
mit an unseren 
Gedanken’, quoted 
in Friedrich Kittler, 
Aufschreibesysteme 
1800/1900, Munich, 
Fink Verlag, 1985, 
p247; cf. infra note 
16.
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zero, change the experience in a fundamental way? Do real time technologies 
change the way we relate to the world, not only in a practical, but also in an 
essential way?
 The relation of man and technology is one of the central topics in the work 
of the French philosopher Bernard Stiegler. In contrast to the technophobe 
attitude embraced by traditional philosophy, Stiegler stresses the constitutive 
role of technology in the ever-continuing process of the creation of man’s 
essence. However, with respect to real time technologies his stance is less 
positive. Stiegler even warns of the metaphysical danger hidden inside these 
technologies, although he takes care to cloak this criticism in allegories, ‘as 
if ’ arguments and questions.
 We would like to investigate why Stiegler is so afraid of real time technologies 
and why his utterances with respect to this subject are so ambiguous. In order 
to answer the first question we will sketch the Heideggerian and Derridean 
background of Stiegler’s idea of the technologically constituted human 
and the way in which he appropriates this philosophical heritage. The 
second question will be dealt with by analysing and comparing several text 
passages. For there are passages in which Stiegler speaks about real time 
as a factual accomplishment and others in which he characterises real time 
as a mere tendency; off and on he proclaims the end of history and warns 
of or fictionalises the end of history. Finally we will try to substantiate the 
philosophical need for this literary ambiguity.
STIEGLER’S READING OF HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA
 
Dasein is Differance
In the first volume of Technics and Time Stiegler dedicates a whole chapter to 
Martin Heidegger, and more specifically to Heidegger’s revolutionary idea 
that Dasein or  human existence insofar as it understands being, is essentially 
temporal. Let us briefly recapitulate the main features of this idea.2
 Dasein is in a double way in time. On the one hand, Dasein is fundamentally 
to-the-world. This means that the world is already there for the Dasein.3 The 
Dasein is thrown into a world or a past that precedes it and from which it 
inherits. Strictly speaking though, this past is not the Dasein’s past because it 
has not lived it. The past is outside of the Dasein and will only become its past 
retroactively, or to use one of Stiegler’s favourite words, ‘afterwards’ (‘après 
coup’4). At the same time however, the Dasein is nothing other than this past 
because its actuality only exists in reference to the past. It consequently must 
assume that which it is not5 or which it is no longer, and this it can only do 
by means of a prosthesis.
 On the other hand, Dasein is also being-toward-death. It is constituted 
by the anticipation of its future end, which will of course always remain 
undetermined or unknown in a strict sense. This implies that Dasein is what 
2. This 
recapitulation is 
mainly based on a 
passage in David 
Wills, ‘Techneology 
or the Discourse of 
Speed’ in Marquard 
Smith and Joanne 
Morra (eds), The 
prosthetic impulse: from 
a posthuman present 
to a biocultural future, 
Cambridge, MA., 
MIT Press, 2006, 
pp237-263.
3. Bernard Stiegler, 
Technics and Time, 
1: The Fault of 
Epimetheus, Richard 
Beardsworth and 
George Collins 
(trans), Stanford, 
Stanford University 
Press, 1998, p231: 
‘Dasein is essentially 
in-the-world; this 
means that the world 
is already there for 
Dasein’.
4. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p30.
5. Ibid., p232.
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it is not yet; it is to-be; it is what it will be; it is becoming or deferment.6 
Being-toward-death thus implies a firm knowledge of an indeterminacy, of 
an end which withdraws itself, which cannot be managed. The experience I 
can have of the death of others cannot fill this gap since the knowledge of 
my death can only pass through my own experience of it. This means that 
my end must remain hidden in order to be mine.7
 Since it is what it is not or what it is not yet, Dasein cannot be grasped in 
both temporal senses. It is retro-jected or pro-jected into something with which 
it cannot coincide, but which it is nonetheless. It is thus a temporality that 
is always characterised by a fundamental difference or delay, as well as by a 
never-accomplished deferment.8 This is the reason why Stiegler characterises 
Dasein as differance in the Derridean sense9 - in its relation to the past and 
the future, Dasein is continuously changing such that its identity is constantly 
postponed or deferred - or as prosthetic in his own words.10 The instruments 
that the Dasein uses to relate to the past and the future are as much grown 
together with its nature - or the lack of it - as lenses with the eyes.
Technology as man’s origin by default
The same idea of man being born without an essence that defines him, 
Stiegler finds in the myth of Prometheus and Epimetheus, but in contrast to 
Heidegger’s Dasein, this myth stresses the importance of technology in filling 
up this lack of essence or origin. The myth goes as follows: the gods assign 
Prometheus and Epimetheus the task of equipping all living beings with one 
or more qualities or gifts. Epimetheus distributes the gifts so that every being 
is sufficiently (but not completely) protected against other beings and against 
the elements. A bird, for example, receives wings to flee and feathers to protect 
itself against cold and water, while the turtle is allotted a shield into which it 
can withdraw itself. However, when all the gifts are distributed, Epimetheus 
realises he has forgotten man; man is ‘naked and shoeless, and had neither 
bed nor arms of defence’.11 In order to solve this problem, Prometheus steals 
the gift of technical knowledge from Hephaistus and Athena and gives it to 
man by way of compensation.
 According to Stiegler, this means that technology is man’s non-original 
origin or origin by default; it allows man to individuate, and this individuation 
can never be wound up or closed; on the contrary, it always implies a radical 
openness and exteriority, which animals lack.
Differance is technological
Now that it is clear that, firstly, the temporal Dasein can only be itself by 
projecting itself outside itself, by exteriorising itself and secondly, that man’s 
origin is technologically mediated, it needs to be explained how man’s 
temporality is fundamentally technological. It will be shown that this idea 
6. Ibid., p216: 
‘Dasein is becoming: 
it is to be its not-yet’.
7. Ibid., p6: ‘Its 
death is what it 
cannot know, and 
to this extent, death 
gives « mineness » its 
excess’.
8. Richard 
Beardsworth, Derrida 
& the Political, 
London/New York, 
Routledge, 1996, 
p100: ‘Time is the 
(self-)deferment 
of time’; Stiegler, 
Technics and Time, 
1: The Fault of 
Epimetheus, op. cit., 
p215.
9. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p216: ‘the 
improbability of 
Dasein itself, its 
indeterminacy, 
that is, its absolute 
difference’.
10. Ibid., p234: 
‘Dasein, essentially 
factical, is pros-
thetic’.
11. Plato, Protagoras, 
Benjamin Jowett, 
op. cit., Rockville, 
Serenity, 2009, 
321d-322e.
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of Stiegler’s is inspired by Edmund Husserl’s concepts of retentions and 
protentions and by Jacques Derrida’s focus on the reproductive character 
of the past. As Husserl saw, our experience of time is not built up from the 
succession of different now-moments. After all, this successive interpretation 
of time does not account for why and how one now is left for another; it 
does not explain the fact that the past present is still related to the new 
present, that it is its past. In other words, it cannot explain the continuity 
of time. And it cannot expound why the actual present does not continue 
to exist but is chased by the new present; a passivity is mysteriously added 
onto the act of presence of the actual present or, in other words, the new 
present is attributed with a power that remains unaccounted for. Husserl 
therefore claims that every ‘apprehension of the present extends beyond 
the “originary impression” of a punctual now, that it encompasses also 
the “retention” of the elapsed duration and the “protention” of the future 
duration of the lived experience’.12 Derrida takes over this idea but slightly 
modifies it by stating that the apprehension of the present does not only 
refer to something which is outside of this present (or which is not-present), 
but which also stands in an indicative or representational relation with the 
present. The retained past, for example, is not part of the perception of the 
present as an act of ‘presentation’ (‘Gegenwärtigung’) - as Husserl thought 
it was - but is a result of the reproduction and thus representation of the 
past in the present (‘Vergegenwärtigung’).13 The presence of consciousness 
to itself, which Husserl links with the presentation of the retained past in 
the living present, will hence be replaced by Derrida with a consciousness 
always somehow escaping from itself. Stiegler, in his turn, emphasises the 
technological aspect of this reproduction of the past and the future in the 
present.14 It is through technology that man has access to his own historicity, 
to his own already-there and not-yet-here. It is through writing for example, 
that we extend our living presence to a past we have not lived ourselves or 
to a future we cannot foresee. Writing is a technology because it formalises 
language and hereby gives it a certain performativity.15 The formalisation 
of language into grammar and spelling rules, into logical laws of argument 
composition, exteriorises language and makes it for example possible that 
the writer is assisted by a spelling corrector and a translation program. In a 
certain sense, the exteriority of written - and to a lesser degree, of spoken - 
language allows one to put the original, inspired thinking on the backburner 
and resort to preconceived constructions; it allows one to produce truth 
instead of being inspired by it; thinking becomes a mechanised activity.16
Real time as the erasure of deferring time
However, not all technologies are the same. Stiegler discerns a line of 
fracture with the advent of what he calls ‘real time technologies’. These are 
the technologies that allow, for example, electronic payment, email traffic, 
12. Rudolf Bernet, 
‘Derrida and His 
Master’s Voice’ in 
William R. McKenna 
and Joseph Claude 
Evans (eds), Derrida 
and Phenomenology, 
Dordrecht/
Boston/London, 
Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1995, 
p1-21, p14.
13. Ibid., pp14-15; 
the presence of 
consciousness to 
itself - which Husserl 
links with the 
presentation of the 
retained past in the 
living present - will 
hence be replaced 
in Derrida’s work 
by a consciousness 
always somehow 
escaping from itself 
by virtue of its very 
structure (‘removed 
from itself in 
advance’, as Derrida 
writes in Limited 
Inc, Alan Bass and 
Samuel Weber 
(trans), Evanston, 
Northwestern 
University Press, 
1988, p56).
14. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1 : The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p220: ‘it is 
tekhne that gives 
differance, that gives 
time’.
15. Bernard Stiegler, 
Technics and Time, 
2: Disorientation, 
Stephen Barker 
(trans), Stanford, 
Stanford University 
Press, 2008, p110, 
http://dx.doi.
org/10.3366/
E1079345308000187
16. Friedrich Kittler 
called Friedrich 
Nietzsche - author 
of ‘our writing 
instruments 
contribute to our 
thoughts’ - ‘the 
first mechanized 
philosopher’ as 
he was the first 
philosopher who 
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live broadcasting, mobile phone communication, etc. They all have the 
common feature of erasing the difference and deferment that was so essential 
in Heidegger’s, but also in Stiegler’s conception of time. The technological 
invention of the video function on mobile phones makes it for example 
possible to film the concert one is attending and to diffuse these images on 
the internet before the concert is finished. In other words, there is almost no 
delay between the event, the registration of the event and the reception of 
it. The duration of the event is reduced to an instantaneous now which does 
not exceed itself towards a past which it is not or towards a future which it 
is not yet, since there is no time allowed to make these leaps. An important, 
if not the only, criterion to evaluate and value information has become the 
speed with which information can be released over a surface as big as possible. 
Instead of the duration of an event being conditioned by the shift that makes 
a coincidence of present, past present and future present impossible, it is 
now conditioned by the possibility of inscription of the momentary. It is the 
technological support or surface - for example, the turning on and off of the 
computer or television screen - that determines the duration of the event. 
Time has become surface.17 The event, and thus also time, has been derealised 
and delocalised; the singularity of the here and now has been eroded.18
 And yet this absence of duration or differance in time creates a suggestion 
of presence, of reality, through absorption rather than through reflection. Just 
as a photograph provides that which has been photographed with a sense 
of reality and historical truth, live television images make us experience the 
present as if it has an already historical sense. The live image proves that this 
event has happened - because of the public sphere in which it is recorded, 
because of the fact that it is never without reporter-watcher, because of the fact 
that it is ‘to be seen unfolding’;19 and this happening appears as something 
which is already established. According to Stiegler this is a false sense of 
historicity though. It is a historicity that obscures the work of time in the sense 
that it tries to resolve the undetermined which constitutes the core of the 
retentional-protentional nature of time. As shown above, we experience time 
by relating to a past that is not entirely ours and by projecting ourselves into a 
future that is actually unknowable. However, in order for time to be time, this 
indeterminacy has to remain undetermined. The knowledge that is implied 
in the anticipation of the future is a knowledge that is always withdrawing.20 
In contracting the future and the past with the present, contemporary 
technologies make the undetermined disappear into the transparency of that 
which is posed in front of us.
AMBIGUITIES IN STIEGLER’S CHARACTERISATION OF REAL TIME
Despite Stiegler’s extensive descriptions of the nature of real time technologies, 
it is not clear whether he believes these technologies are an accomplished 
fact or rather a fiction with a warning function. As we will document, at 
composed his 
thoughts straight 
on a typewriter, 
Friedrich Kittler, 
‘The Mechanized 
Philosopher’ in 
Laurence A. Rickels 
(ed), Looking After 
Nietzsche, Albany, 
State University of 
New York Press, 
pp195-207, p195.
17. Stiegler refers 
to a passage in 
Paul Virilio, Vitesse 
et politique (Paris, 
Éditions Galilée, 
1977) to affirm 
that real time 
technologies turn 
the duration of 
time into a ‘writing 
surface’, Bernard 
Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 2: 
Disorientation, p124.
18. Cf. note 50. 
Since an event 
comes with a 
heightened sense of 
the ‘here and now’ 
of its occurrence, 
its derealisation 
will consist in 
an uprooting 
abstraction. This is 
obviously so in the 
case of live coverage 
of what happens in 
distant places, or 
in images of what 
happened at other 
times. However, 
according to Derrida 
this is also the case 
in the most ‘present’ 
act of perception, 
which is as much a 
differential ‘play of 
traces’ as reading is.
19. Bernard Stiegler, 
Technics and Time, 2: 
Disorientation, p120 ; 
Bernard Stiegler, La 
technique et le temps 
2. La désorientation, 
Paris, Éditions 
Galilée, 1996, p143: 
‘être vu se faisant’.
20. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p197 and 
p216.
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one time Stiegler claims that technology’s ever accelerating speed actually 
suppresses the creation of differences so as to swallow up the human; at 
another time he presents this doom image as an allegory illustrating the vital 
importance of the differential play. Thus it seems that Stiegler has himself 
become indifferent to a distinction that should be respected, if only for being 
a distinction, namely between a tendency and the realisation thereof. Rather 
than just wanting to sort out Stiegler’s stance with respect to this topic, we 
would like to investigate the consistency of these positions with Stiegler’s basic 
insight of the technologically mediated origin of man. In other words, is it at 
all possible to declare the end of the differential play when one adheres to a 
conception of the human that is built on the fundamental differantial nature 
of the human? We will examine five text passages, each addressing the same 
theme in a somewhat different way.
First passage: The divorce between culture and technology 
In the ‘General Introduction’ to the Technics and Time series Stiegler notes that 
‘it is as if a divorce could now be pronounced between, on the one hand, the 
technosciences and, on the other, the culture that claimed to have produced 
them’.21 For example, the introduction of technoscience in the world of dating 
- the technological innovation of being able to track down people matching 
your interest list - might be said to have eradicated the culture of meeting and 
seducing. Yet a couple of lines further down the argument Stiegler observes 
how the ever-accelerating processes of innovation have already entailed that 
divorce; the divorce is thus no longer hypothetical: ‘It results in a divorce, 
if not between culture and technics, at least between the rhythms of cultural 
evolution and the rhythms of technical evolution’.22 The transition from ‘as 
if ’ (‘comme si’) to ‘in fact’ (‘de fait’) is not really argued for; it is performed as 
if it went without saying. ‘It is as if ’ presents a situation in figural terms; ‘in 
fact’ takes the figure literally. ‘In fact’ is far less discreet: it implies a claim, 
while the ‘as if ’ suspends the judgment it seems to entail. Beside the fact that 
the linguistic difference between ‘as if ’ and ‘in fact’ is so obvious, Stiegler’s 
linguistic ambiguity is even more remarkable when one realises that divorce 
is essentially a matter of pronunciation; one is not divorced until the divorce 
has been pronounced.
Second passage: The becoming-ant of man
The second text passage treats the possibility of a future for mankind that 
is apparently opposed to the one sketched in the previous passage. Here, 
Stiegler discusses the idea of prosthetic man being naturalised instead of 
being devoured by technology. However, a closer reading reveals that Stiegler 
understands the naturalisation of man or the becoming-ant of man as the 
technologically induced reduction of the differance towards a point zero, which 
21. Ibid., p14; 
Bernard Stiegler, La 
technique et le temps 1. 
La faute d’Épiméthée, 
Paris, Éditions 
Galilée, 1994, 
p28: ‘Tout se passe 
comme si un divorce 
pouvait se trouver 
prononcé entre la 
technoscience d’un 
côté, et, de l’autre 
côté, la culture qui 
l’aurait produite’.
22. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The Fault 
of Epimetheus, op. 
cit., p15; Stiegler, La 
technique et le temps 1. 
La faute d’Épiméthée, 
op. cit., p29: ‘De 
fait, il en résulte un 
divorce.’
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is exactly the meaning behind the idea of technoscience devouring culture.
 In Technics and Time, 1 Stiegler writes - and he quotes Simondon here - 
that ‘the ever more concretized object [that is, the ever more functionally 
overdetermined technical object] tends toward naturalness, and “this 
process may well appear as the naturalization of the human”’.23 The use of 
the conditional tense (‘may well’) as well as the verb ‘appear’ prevent the 
said ‘naturalization of man’ from being taken literally: it remains a virtuality, 
an appearance even. However, in the essay ‘Allégorie de la fourmilière’24 
man’s naturalisation is presented less as a virtual possibility, than as an actual 
condition of sorts. The affirmative stance in this essay is rather strange 
since the allegory already appears earlier on in Stiegler’s work, in a longer 
version in which the limits of the allegory are clearly indicated. In this earlier 
version the allegory is preceded by the question: ‘Can ants be said to “share 
knowledge”?’25, to which the final sentence answers negatively: even if ants do 
externalise their memory and organise their territory, they are mere ‘reactive 
agents’, not ‘cognitive agents’.26 Thus, man cannot be compared to ants as 
the temporality of ants is not ‘constituted in relation to the temporality of a 
technics which is itself a technical development or becoming’.27 Since, however, 
the first and last line of that paragraph are not quoted in the ‘Allégorie de la 
fourmilière’ the limitation of the analogy is not brought out so clearly. On the 
contrary, Stiegler now stresses the continuity: ‘the exteriorization of human 
memory ... would result in the creation of a reactive network, as if the totality 
of experience could hence be standardized and disincarnated’.28 However, in 
contrast to the conditional tense in the Simondon-quote in Technics and Time 
1, the conditional ‘would’ and hypothetical ‘as if ’ in the above sentence do 
not bracket the analogy but further it beyond its limitedness. More generally, 
the tenor of De la misère symbolique (‘symbolic misery’ or ‘poverty’) - the book in 
which the allegory is published - is - as the title indicates - quite pronounced 
or denunciative. 
Third passage: The almost completely technologised man
A little earlier in the ‘Allégorie de la fourmilière’ Stiegler writes how technical 
developments would allow for the ‘almost perfect accomplishment’ of what 
Leroi-Gourhan calls ‘a pure and final synchronisation’: ‘the synchronous 
system which Leroi-Gourhan had anticipated could accomplish itself almost 
perfectly ...  It would have the advantage of allowing individual specialization, 
as in an anthill’.29 How the individual distribution of tasks in an anthill 
establishes a system that is in perfect synchronicity with itself is of less interest 
to us than the re-occurrence of the adverbs ‘almost’ and ‘as’. Similarly to the 
anthill passage, these adverbs thicken the similarity between man and ant, 
despite their dissimilarity.
 Furthermore, it is tempting to relate Stiegler’s ‘almost’, in the above quote, to 
Rousseau’s use of that adverb in his characterisation of the savage’s nakedness: 
23. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p81.
24. Bernard Stiegler, 
‘Allégorie de la 
fourmilière. La perte 
d’individuation 
à l’âge 
hyperindustriel’ 
in Ib., De la misère 
symbolique 1. L’époque 
hyperindustrielle, 
Paris, Éditions 
Galilée, 2004, pp95-
161; the essay’s title 
may be translated 
as ‘Allegory of the 
anthill’.
25. Stiegler, 
Technics and Time, 
2: Disorientation, op. 
cit., p167.
26. Ibid., p167-
8; to what extent 
does Stiegler 
here harden the 
distinction between 
‘reactive’ and 
‘cognitive’ agency 
into an opposition 
reminiscent 
of Plato’s 
divide between 
‘hypomnesis’ and 
‘anamnesis’?
27. Stiegler, 
‘Technics of 
Decision: an 
Interview’ in 
Angelaki, 8, 2 (2003): 
151-68, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1080/ 
0969725032000162 
639
28. Stiegler, 
‘Allégorie de la 
fourmilière’, op. cit., 
p156.
29. Ibid., p152.
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the Carib is ‘almost naked’30 (‘presque nu’) but nevertheless as powerful, if not 
more so, in preserving his life than the civilised man with all his tools. In his 
wonderful reading of Rousseau’s Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality 
Among Men, Stiegler identifies this adverb as that which allows Rousseau to think 
the necessity of the fall of the original, pure man; it is because man was never 
completely naked, because the seed of civilisation was always already present 
from the beginning, that the degeneration could have occurred. Because 
Stiegler does not share this technophobe view, but on the contrary, makes a plea 
for the positive significance of technology, he transforms Rousseau’s ‘almost’ 
into a ‘default’ that is ‘almost not a default’.31 Nevertheless, it is somehow thanks 
to Rousseau that Stiegler comes to the formulation of his problem: ‘Rousseau 
will not, therefore, have been mistaken; he will have been right, almost …’32 
Rousseau’s ‘almost’ is the lever for Stiegler’s deconstruction of the metaphysical 
myth of the full and pure origin. However, if Rousseau’s Carib is ‘almost naked’ 
at the origin, then it seems that the figure of man Stiegler projects in the end, 
his ‘last man’ so to speak, will be ‘almost an insect’, or what is the same, almost 
a technically eclipsed human. Whereas Rousseau uncouples anthropogenesis 
and technogenesis in order to think the (pure) origin of man, Stiegler does 
the same but for thinking the (pure) end or disappearance of man. Despite 
their initial divergence - for example, Stiegler does not stop repeating that the 
anthropogenesis is a technogenesis and vice versa - they end up in a similar 
thinking in terms of purity. The fiction of a pure technics (of a pure ‘end of 
man’) is perhaps more essential to the way Stiegler organises his arguments 
than he may care to acknowledge.33
 However, we have to admit that the essay ‘Allégorie de la fourmilière’ 
leaves no doubt about its status: it is an allegory. As much as Rousseau is 
clear about the status of his tale of a ‘state of origin’, Stiegler is clear about 
the fictionality of his narrative: ‘The reader could object that the hypothesis 
[of the becoming-ant of man] is but a fiction that does not correspond to his 
everyday experiences’.34 To this virtual objection Stiegler replies the following. 
First of all, the reader is asked to consider that ‘this fiction describes an 
asymptotic tendency, with which one has to compose’.35 Hence, the fiction 
of a pure technics does not so much have a descriptive  as a heuristic value. 
Secondly, the reader should not forget that he is very much privileged: 
‘having the capacity and inclination to read a book like Symbolic misery, s/he 
is a representative of a social category that is probably endangered’.36 Which 
is  to say that the people whose differance is supported by the book might be 
the only ones for whom the ‘pseudo-humanity’37 is still a fictitious prospect; 
for the majority of people, however, it has become a reality. 
Fourth passage: exact dramatisation
At the beginning of the second chapter of Technics and Time, 1 Stiegler describes 
how all domains of life are now being ‘technicized’: ‘In the technological 
30. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p117; 
Stiegler, La technique 
et le temps 1. La faute 
d’Épiméthée, op. cit., 
p127.
31. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p122. 
32. Ibid., p133.
33. It seems that, at 
least on occasion, 
Stiegler is in a hurry 
to impart a sense of 
absolute urgency, 
as if the end were 
near. However, as 
Richard Beardsworth 
puts it in the final 
chapter to Derrida 
& the Political, op. 
cit., p150: ‘There 
is no technocalypse 
of the human. Pure 
technics is pure 
metaphysics’.
34. Stiegler, 
‘Allégorie de la 
fourmilière’, op. cit., 
p157. 
35. Ibid., p157. 
36. Ibid., p157-8. 
37. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p87.
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context of Gestell a “technicization” of all domains of life is experienced on 
a massive scale’.38 The tenor of this passage is Heideggerian through and 
through, from the title of the section - ‘The question coming to us from 
Technics’ - up to the invocation of the imminent assault on the human essence 
by technics. Interestingly enough, Stiegler characterises this sketch of recent 
technological developments and the fate they have in store for us, humans, 
as a ‘cursory, dramatic, but nevertheless exact presentation’.39 He thus admits 
that his image of the technical eclipse of the human is a little exaggerated, 
that he has added a little extra, but in order to - and this is remarkable - gain 
exactitude. Readers of Gilles Deleuze will perhaps recognise in these words 
Deleuze’s characterisation of his own philosophical enterprise as a science that 
is anexact, but rigorous.40 However, in Deleuze this description is grounded in 
a meticulously developed metaphysics of Ideas that are non-actual (and thus 
impossibly exact), but determinable (which requires rigor). The problem in 
Stiegler seems to be that this exact dramatisation is not accounted for in his 
theory. Fictions (of a pure technics), allegories (of the anthill), conditional 
tenses (‘may be’), hypothetical and affirmation-suspending adverbs (‘as if ’, 
‘almost’) seem to be essential in his thinking but are never admitted this status. 
However, before turning to an examination of the philosophical value of the 
fictional in Stiegler’s work, we would like to refer to a last passage in which 
Stiegler remains unclear about the actuality of what he is describing. It is a 
passage that brings us back to the theme of real time.
Fifth passage: from ‘real time’ to real time
As it comes to so-called ‘real time technologies’ and ‘the end of history’ this 
may entail, a similar passage from ‘tendency’ to ‘actualization’ is to be noted. 
Early on in the ‘General Introduction’ to the series, a couple of lines after 
having noted that the divorce between culture and technology has occurred, 
Stiegler notes that indeed ‘technics evolves more quickly than culture: the 
temporal relation between the two is a tension in which there is both advance 
and delay’.41 As we saw in the first part of this paper, this differential tension 
is characteristic of the process of temporalisation, of the prosthetic time 
of mortals. According to Stiegler this differential human time is severely 
threatened by new technologies: ‘It is as if time has leapt outside itself: not 
only because the process of decision making and anticipation has irresistibly 
moved over to the side of the “machine” or technical complex, but because, 
in a certain sense, our age is in the process of breaking the time barrier’.42 
The qualifications Stiegler uses - ‘as if ’ and ‘in a certain sense’ - are vague and 
provisional, which indicates that he is prudent. However, on the final page of 
the first volume, today’s day seems already to have gone beyond the specifically 
deferred time of the history of Being: new conditions of ‘event-ization’43 have 
today been put in place, which are characteristic of what Stiegler calls ‘light-
time’, a time that seems to conceal all difference and difference.44 Despite the 
38. Ibid., p85.
39. Ibid., p87.
40. Gilles Deleuze, 
Capitalisme et 
schizophrénie 2. Mille 
Plateaux, Paris, 
Editions de Minuit, 
p454-455.
41. Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p15.
42. Ibid., p15.
43. As R. 
Beardsworth and 
G. Collins translate 
‘l’événementialisation’, 
in Stiegler, Technics 
and Time, 1: The 
Fault of Epimetheus, 
op. cit., p16.
44. Ibid., p276: 
‘Light-time forms 
the age of the 
difference in real 
time, an exit from 
the deferred time 
specific to the 
history of being that 
seems to constitute 
a concealing of 
difference and a 
threat to all kinds of 
difference’.
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softening effect of the ‘seems to’, Stiegler’s tone in this sentence is definitely 
affirmative. In the following line, this even builds up to a straightforward 
declaration of the end of history: ‘one can speak of the end of history or 
of a change of epoch’.45 ‘One can speak’, that is to say: one can speak with 
some good reason, one can speak well of ‘the end of history’. As history has 
revealed, it is very problematic to declare ‘the end of history’ or ‘a change 
of epoch’. Stiegler should know this, as he approvingly quotes Blanchot’s 
reflections On a Change of Epoch.46 Blanchot claims that a change of epoch is 
neither a matter of certainty nor of uncertainty. A change of epoch - ‘if there 
is one’, as Blanchot adds - can only have a ‘discrete force’,47 which invalidates 
both certainty and uncertainty.48 For ‘a change of epoch’ would alter the very 
terms in which it may be cognitively evaluated. In stating that one could 
speak (well) of ‘a change of epoch’ and ‘the end of history’ Stiegler seems to 
lose this sense of discretion. Although, on many occasions, Stiegler is careful 
enough to put ‘real time’ between inverted commas, for instance when he 
writes about ‘certain effects of technical developments ... that in computing 
one calls “real time”’,49 or talks about ‘what is called “real time”’.50 ‘Real time’ 
may well have been the talk of the day at the time Stiegler was drafting the 
first volumes. It would have been wise only to mention that expression, as if 
he had not much use for it, not yet or never, in the way philosophers read 
newspapers or catch rumours. However, the small defence offered by the 
‘technique’ of inverted commas51 is dropped when he affirms that ‘real time 
is a derealisation of time, as if time were really real only in remaining unreal, 
chronically diachronic, asynchronized’.52 Similarly, when he affirms that ‘light-
time forms the age of differance in real time’,53 he does not use commas. As a 
result, ‘real time’ seems to be more real than it can be, in effect.
***
PHILOSOPHICAL INCONSISTENCY OR UNCONTROLLED RISE OF 
MILITANCY?
These five text passages have sufficiently demonstrated how Stiegler keeps the 
reader, and maybe also himself, dangling about the actuality of his observations 
regarding new technologies neutralising the differance that grounds man and 
culture. This ambiguity is remarkable since the straightforward affirmation of 
the technical eclipse of the human would imply a contradiction with Stiegler’s 
central idea of technology as the means of meeting man’s lack of essence 
without ever being able to fill it up. Thus, for reasons of consistency Stiegler 
should have to reject the idea of a technocalypse: because man is originally 
short of an essence, every attempt of his to fill up this gap will necessarily 
remain faulty. In other words, the creation of different prostheses and the 
deferment of a completing prosthesis, is without end, it ‘is endlessness itself ’.54 
The differance can never be stopped, however small or almost invisible it may 
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be. This is exactly Derrida’s point in Echographies of Television, the book with 
conversations between Derrida en Stiegler: 
There is never an absolutely real time. What we call real time, and it is 
easy to understand how it can be opposed to deferred time in everyday 
language, is in fact never pure. What we call real time is simply an 
extremely reduced  “differance”, but there is no purely real time because 
temporalization itself is structured by a play … of traces.55
 
In other words: it is as if Derrida has to remind Stiegler of the ever-remaining 
rest or ‘between’56 that prevents a pure mankind or a pure technics from taking 
place. However dominant technics can be, it will never be able to prevent its 
being used in a way that was not intended, or giving rise to languages and 
behaviours with non-technical goals.57
 Some scholars, such as David Wills, argue that Stiegler’s forgetfulness 
might be the effect of an ‘ideology or a metaphysics of realism’.58 When the 
militant in Stiegler takes over - wishing to make the world a better place, a 
place where the differance can reign in all its variety, and not in the margins 
of what the techno-capitalist society leaves us - the philosopher in him turns 
a blind eye. 
LITERARY HIGH SPEED TECHNOLOGY
It is our opinion that there might be more to this ambiguity than just 
philosophical inconsistency or an uncontrolled rise of militancy. And it is the 
same David Wills who somehow puts us on track. In his article ‘Techneology 
or the Discourse of Speed’ Wills argues that, in Stiegler’s own reasoning, 
technology can be seen at work in the numerous neologisms he devises (for 
example, ‘who-what totality’59), in his rather poetical utterances (‘Man is this 
accident of automobility caused by a default of essence [une panne d’essence, a 
“lack of fuel”, an “empty tank”]’60), in the word games he plays (the ‘necessary 
default’ [‘le default qu’il faut’]61) and the linguistic coincidences that form 
the starting point of new theories (the rhyming of ‘cortex’ and ‘silex’ (‘flint’), 
for example, which inspires him for his thesis of the mutual determination 
of man and technology62). In these moments of literary cleverness, it is as if 
Stiegler’s thinking is occurring in spite of himself. It is something originally 
exterior (for example the fact that ‘cortex’ rhymes with ‘silex’) which all of a 
sudden becomes the core of a so-called intimate activity: thinking. It is as if 
Stiegler is running behind on something that used to be instigated by himself. 
However, at the same time one can say that his thinking takes place exactly at 
the moment when the linguistic coincidence is remarked. There is no delay, 
no running behind, but, on the contrary, a perfect coincidence between 
the observation and the thinking. This allows Wills to say that Stiegler’s 
neologisms and quasi-poetical leaps constitute a mis-en-scène of absolute speed. 
removed, as it were.
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It is ‘language travelling at the speed of light ... always already projected it 
“arrives” ahead of itself ... always already in translation it is a displacement 
out of the therefore never intact original moment of its production, en route 
at lightning speed towards the outside limit of comprehensibility’.63 
 This implies that Stiegler’s writing style exemplifies his theory in a perfect 
way: technology (such as language) is a non-original origin. The question is 
whether this correspondence also applies for his undecided way of describing 
the fate of so-called ‘real time technologies’. Can this literary ambiguity be 
explained by referring to the content he wants to convey? In other words, is 
this literary ambiguity a theoretical necessity? 
REAL TIME AS A DELEUZIAN-KANTIAN IDEE
In order to answer this question, let us go back to Deleuze. As we mentioned 
above, Deleuze’s non-classical ontology is centred round Ideas. These are 
not to be confused with Platonic Ideas or supermundane, perfect and unique 
essences that are exemplified in particular beings, things and concepts. 
Deleuze conceives Ideas rather in the Kantian way. As he explains himself,64 
Ideas have to be understood in a double fashion. They are either the ideal 
focus which lies outside the boundaries of experience and upon whose lines 
the concepts of the understanding (for example, the concept of causality) 
are arranged; or they are the common horizon that embraces all concepts 
of the understanding. As such, the object of an Idea is neither a fiction, 
nor a hypothesis. It is an object which can be neither given nor known, but 
must be represented without being able to be directly determined. On the 
contrary, the Idea’s object is undetermined, and this neither because of an 
imperfection in our knowledge of it nor because of a lack in the object, but 
because it is a structure that acts as a focus or a horizon within perception. It 
confers unity upon the objects of experience without being itself a unity or 
an entity, just as love can unify different attitudes (ranging from caring for a 
child to killing the man who raped your wife) without being itself something 
determined. The undetermined ideal object makes it possible to identify 
objects of experience and it is only by this activity that it can be determined 
itself. Thus, it can only be determined itself in an indirect way, that is by 
analogy with the determinate objects of experience. As these analogies are 
in principle infinite, the object of the Idea is infinitely determinable. 
 Can Stiegler’s idea of real time be considered such a Deleuzian-Kantian 
Idea? The passages in which Stiegler’s pessimism is very pronounced clearly 
do not regard real time as a fiction or a hypothesis. Real time has a reality 
that a fiction or a hypothesis lacks; everyone who has lived the pre-digital age 
will agree that life does go faster now, that there certainly is less time to reflect 
upon events, that the reflection almost comes together with the presentation 
of the event and is thus hardly to be called a reflection. Real time is present 
among us, it haunts our time.
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 But what Stiegler seems to forget and  Derrida has to remind him of, is 
that real time does not have the presence or reality of a chair, for example. Its 
features cannot be clearly distinguished and identified. Every instance that can 
be called upon as an instantiation of real time (for example, the video function 
on a mobile phone) will never completely realise it (for example, the decision 
that still has to be taken as to where and when the images will be posted, still 
involves a moment of difference). For every instantiation of real time, uses can 
be imagined and effectuated which reintroduce time to the synchronicity, which 
reintroduce a reflective moment, a delay, a deferment. An instantiation of real 
time is never only and never definitively an instantiation of real time.65 
 So, real time has a reality that is not the reality of a chair. Because of this 
different reality, if real time needs to be determined, it can only be done so 
by referring to things and concepts that allow for a determination. That is 
to say, real time can only be determined by analogy with discrete, empirical 
facts, such as an anthill, or by analogy with delimited concepts such as a 
divorce. However, this is not to say that it is itself an empirical fact. On the 
contrary, it is an ideal horizon out of which different empirical facts get their 
meaning. It is a line that unites phenomena without being a common divisor 
of these phenomena, or a chronological or causal link. It is a line similar to 
the one distinguished by the two main characters in Witold Gombrowicz novel 
Cosmos.66 A sparrow hanging by the neck on a wire in a tree, the slippery lips 
of two women, a crack on the ceiling and a broken farm tool in the garden 
constitute the knots of a line that changes direction every time one tries to 
figure out the connection. The line brings sense into this whole, without this 
sense being explicable, let alone being understandable.
 In sum, Stiegler’s concept of real time (as well as some other ‘regulative’ 
notions such as the naturalisation of man, the derealisation of time and the 
end of history) can only make sense and can only be consistent with his theory 
of man’s origin by default, if it functions as a Deleuzian-Kantian Idea, as an 
ideal focus or a common horizon. The ambiguity in which Stiegler dwells 
has the wrong subject. The question is not so much whether real time is a 
fiction or a fact, whether it is realised or not, because it is realised in, for 
instance, the video function on a cell phone and the poetics of his language 
operating at light speed. Such and similar realisations of real time, however, 
do not exhaust real time. Just as the care for a child is love, but love cannot be 
reduced to the care for a child, real time never coincides with its realisations. 
The ambiguity should thus regard the irrecoverable character of real time. We 
have to admit that it is a thin line between the idea that real time can never be 
exhausted by its realisations and the idea that real time is never realised, for 
the first idea implies that the realisation of real time is never complete and 
in that sense not a fact. We think that Stiegler’s use of allegories, conditional 
tenses and affirmation-suspending adverbs certainly indicate a sensibility of 
this ungraspable nature of the Idea of real time. They have one tedious side 
effect though: they deny real time’s reality.
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